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 Abstract. 
Many important decisions are taken within multi-adult households rather than by 
individuals. This paper reports the results of the first economic experiment designed to test 
theories of household rather than individual choice. We use a sample of established couples 
and face them individually and jointly with decision tasks involving lotteries. We test whether 
their choices conform to expected utility theory.  We find that choices made by couples 
exhibit the same kinds of patterns (e.g. the common ratio and common consequence effects) 
as are regularly recorded with individuals, but that choices made jointly are more risk averse 
than those made separately.  
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JEL Codes: C920, D130, D80. 
 
  1 
Introduction. 
The expected utility-maximizing household is one of the most common models 
employed to understand economic behaviour. This standard model, which is used to 
investigate saving, insurance decisions, labour supply etc., involves two important 
assumptions. First, that the household acts as if it has a single set of preferences and secondly 
that these preferences conform to the axioms of expected utility theory (EUT). The first 
assumption has received a significant amount of scrutiny (e.g. Browning and Chiappori et al, 
1998), but very little attention has been paid to the second assumption for households as 
opposed to individuals. In fact though there is copious experimental evidence on how 
individuals choose, to date there has been very little experimental investigation into how 
multi-adult households or couples make their decisions.1  
This paper therefore presents results of an experiment designed to investigate the 
following issue: to what extent do the decisions made by couples and the decisions made 
separately by individuals who are part of a couple conform to the standard model? In outline 
the experiment is as follows: we use a sample of established couples2 and present them with 
tasks involving binary choices between lotteries of the kind depicted in Figure 1. In the first 
section of the experiment the subjects are separated and face choices separately; in the second 
section they remain apart and must predict their partner’s answers from the first section; in the 
                                                 
1 For instance in Starmer’s (2001) survey of the field of risky choice, there is no discussion of 
evidence on household as opposed to individual behaviour. There is an interesting body of 
work by psychologists on this issue (see Corfman and Lehmann, 1983 for example), but the 
questions asked provide little insight into the applicability of economists’ models of choice.  
2 Meaning that the couple are in a relationship of at least one year’s standing and live together. 
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third section they rejoin their partner and make choices as a couple.3 The tasks are not all 
repeated in each section, though there is some overlap. Each lottery has possible monetary 
payoffs for each individual within the couple and these payoffs may be different. A random 
lottery device is used to provide incentives. 
[Figure 1 here.] 
It might reasonably be supposed that the results of individual choice experiments 
should carry over into household decision-making. However, leaving aside the issue of 
differences in subject pool, the decision-making environment of the household might 
eliminate certain anomalies commonly observed in individual choice. For instance, with two 
people scrutinising probabilities rather than one, the kind of editing and framing effects which 
underlie Kahneman and Tversky’s 1979 explanation of the Allais paradox might not apply.  
Conversely, even if individuals separately have preferences which satisfy EUT, the rule used 
to aggregate preferences within the household might produce choices for the household at 
variance with the predictions of EUT. So, the existing theory and experimental evidence on 
individual choice does not therefore imply much about how households make choices in risky 
situations and in particular, whether households conform to the standard model. 
In the standard model of household choice, the household is assumed to be unitary - 
that is, the household is modelled as a single agent with a single set of preferences - either 
                                                 
3  Bone et al, 1999, 2000 investigate decision-making in pairs, but in their experiment 
university students are paired at random whereas we are interested in the behaviour of pre-
existing decision-making units – i.e. established couples. Secondly, in their design the pairs of 
students are given a collective payment and must decide how to divide it. Our lotteries assign 
payments to particular individuals (and our payment procedures reflect this), though this is not 
to deny the possibility of bargains being made or anticipated. 
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because there are no public goods local to the household and all members share the same 
preferences or because the structure of incentives within the household align individual 
preferences with those of the decision-maker (as in, for instance, the ‘rotten kid theorem’, 
Becker 1974). Empirical testing (see Lundberg et al, 1997 or Alderman et al, 1996 for 
example) gives results largely hostile to the unitary model, particularly its prediction of 
income pooling (IP) which is the property that household behaviour may respond to changes 
in aggregate household income but not to who in the household earns that income. This has 
prompted a large number of alternative household models, but nevertheless IP remains a 
convenient modelling assumption in many contexts. For this experiment we design a mix of 
tests of EUT, some of which are conditional on households satisfying IP and some of which 
are not. One reason for having the conditional tests is that in many empirical situations it may 
not be possible to observe the sources of income in a household. We wish to see whether any 
departures from EUT are robust in the sense that they are still observable in the face of 
variation in the identity of the income recipient. 
 
II Theory. 
For simplicity we consider a two-person household. Let agent i =1,2 receive payment 
mis in state of the world s = 1,…,S. A typical lottery p (or q, r or s) is then a vector (p1, …,pS). 
The standard sign,   denotes the weak preference relationship for the household, with strict 
preference denoted   and indifference ~, constructed in the usual manner. 
A household obeys expected utility theory in its joint choices if there exists a strictly 
increasing function w(m1s,m2s) such that the household ranks lotteries according to, 
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also possible to define utility functions, Wi (p) i=1,2, for the two individuals. Note that the 
relationship between the Wis and W depends on the household aggregation rule. So the fact 
that the household choices conform to EUT does not imply that the Wis satisfy the axioms of 
EUT - or vice versa. 
We shall say that the household income pools (IP) or that it is an income pooler if 
w(m1s,m2s) = w(m1s
',m2s
') whenever m1s+m2s = m1s
'+m2s
' for all s.  
Although w has two arguments rather than the one that is typical of individual choice, 
nevertheless for the household or individual which maximizes W(.), preferences between 
lotteries should have the familiar properties of EUT. Figure 2 shows a standard unit 
probability triangle representing lotteries involving three possible values of w: w1, w2 and w3, 
with 123 www  . In the figure, the solid line connecting a and e is parallel to that between c 
and d.  
[Figure 2 here.] 
In the unit probability triangle, EUT predicts that indifference curves are straight, 
parallel lines. However, individuals frequently fail to conform to the predictions of EUT in a 
number of ways. Possibly, three of the most robust anomalies (see Starmer, 2001 for a 
comprehensive survey) are the common ratio effect, the common consequence effect and 
failure of the betweenness property. In the first, individuals tend to choose the safer option 
represented by choosing a out of the pair {a,e} and then the riskier option d out of the pair 
{c,d}. In the second a is chosen out of {a,b} and then d is picked from {c,d}.  In the third case, 
EUT implies that individuals who choose b out of {a,b} should choose e out of {a,e}, whereas 
often individuals choose b and then a. Indifference curves in the triangle therefore seem to be 
more like the broken lines depicted in figure 2, than the straight and parallel lines implied by 
EUT. The experiment is designed to see if couples have similar revealed preferences. 
  5 
 
III Experimental Design. 
Figure 3 summarises the experimental design. Upon entering the venue, one member 
of the pair was randomly allocated either a ‘wave’ or ‘triangle’ card, their partner receiving 
the other card. This allocation of cards was then used to separate pair, one set of partners 
being taken into a separate room. The first two sections of the experiment were conducted 
with partners in these separate rooms, pairs then rejoined each other for the final section of the 
experiment. Throughout the experiment the investigators used a script (available from the 
authors) and at the start of each section subjects received summary instructions for the tasks to 
be undertaken in that section. 
 [Figure 3 about here.] 
In section one of the experiment (i.e. where subjects are separated from their partners), 
subjects faced choices, similar to those depicted in figure one. The description of a typical 
lottery was composed of three elements: ranges of numbers were shown along the top, 
underneath which where shown corresponding payoffs for the subject, below which were 
given corresponding payoffs for their partner.4 The numbers along the top corresponded to 
numbered discs in a bag of one hundred discs shown to the subjects by the experimenters.  
Subjects were told that, at the end of the experiment, one of the choice tasks would be chosen 
at random for each couple and played out for real. If this was one of the tasks undertaken in 
section 1, then subjects would play out the  lottery they chose in that task by taking a 
                                                 
4 For the joint choice questions, the triangle partner’s payoffs were always shown first. We 
found no evidence that this order gave triangle partners more or less influence in the joint 
decisions. 
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numbered disc from the bag, that number determining the resulting payoffs for them and their 
partner.5  
Two questions designed to test understanding were placed at the end of the briefing for 
the first section. After all subjects had answered these questions satisfactorily, they completed 
the section 1 questions in their own time 6. Answer books were then collected.  
In section 2, subjects (who remained separated from their partners) were asked to 
predict their partners’ answers in section 1. Before doing so, they were led through the 
relevant instructions, including those concerning incentives (see below). After completing 
these prediction tasks, subjects were faced with a short questionnaire which collected 
demographic data. Once this was completed answer books were collected and subjects 
rejoined their partners for the final section of the experiment.  
In the final section, couples made choices jointly. At the start of this section, couples  
selected a single, small envelope from a shuffled pile of similar envelopes placed in front of 
them, but were told not to open it until instructed. No prompts were given as to which partner 
should make this selection. The full set of envelopes contained lottery ticket numbers for all 
possible question from all sections, one lottery ticket being placed inside each envelope. The 
randomly drawn number inside the envelope selected by a couple determined which question 
they would play out 'for real' at the end of the experiment.   
The subjects were given details of how the payout procedures would operate at the end 
                                                 
5 Subjects were not told at that stage about the remaining sections of the experiment. 
6  An initial version of the design consisted of 10 questions in each section. This was 
subsequently extended to add a further two questions. Standard statistical tests indicated that 
there was no significant differences between the data for the questions common to both 
variants and accordingly these responses were pooled within our analysis. 
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of the experiment and led through the instructions for section 3.  Once all subjects had 
completed their tasks, we began opening the small envelopes, executing lotteries and making 
payoffs.  
The incentive system was as follows: for lottery ticket numbers from 1 to n, the 
triangle partner played his or her choice for that section 1 question and the wave partner 
received £0.50 for each correct prediction (in section 2) of their partners section 1 answers. 
For numbers between n+1 and 2n, the wave partner played his or her choice from section 1 
while the triangle partner was paid £0.50 for each correct prediction (in section 2) of their 
partners section 1 answers. For numbers from 2n+1 to 3n, the couple played their joint choice 
for that question from section 3 and no money was paid for predictions. This random lottery 
system is incentive compatible if individuals are selfish7 (and make no binding agreements on 
ex-post trade), but it would be usual to suppose some degree of other-regarding preferences 
within couples. As a result, it is conceivable that an altruist might view the first two sections 
of the experiment as an exercise in co-ordination and possibly choose so as to maximize the 
predictive success of his or her partner.  We aimed to guard against this possibility in three 
ways.  First, prior to the experiment we told subjects only that the research was aiming 'to help 
us understand how couples make decisions'.  As a second measure the prediction questions (in 
section 2) always came after the separate choice questions (in section 1) and we saved the 
briefing for section 2 until all subjects in a session had completed section 1. So, subjects 
therefore had no reason to anticipate that they should answer in section 1 so as to raise the 
possible payoffs of their partner. As a final measure we kept the payments for prediction to a 
relatively small fraction of the payments associated with the choice sections. The payments 
                                                 
7 Cubitt et al 1998 provide evidence that random lottery schemes are a reliable means of 
eliciting preferences even when subjects are not EUT maximizers. 
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obtainable from the choice section ranged from £0 to £80, whereas the range for the prediction 
section was only £0 to £12. And in the choice questions, the expected values of the options 
always differed by more than £0.50. This means that a risk neutral income pooling agent (for 
example) would not make an expected gain from switching choices in order to improve the 
predictive success of their partner. 
We went to some trouble to preserve the confidentiality of the answers from sections 1 
and 2.  Partners were paid sequentially and separately with any payments placed in envelopes. 
The payment process occurred in another room or in a position which masked any payments 
made. Subjects were not informed of their partner's answers in section 1 of the experiment and 
they were not given information about the accuracy of their partner's predictions. 8  Now, 
theories of the household are rarely explicit on whether individuals are privy to the patterns of 
consumption and income of their partners. However, there is plenty of empirical evidence of 
asymmetric information within the household. For instance, in a survey of spending habits in 
UK households, Pahl, 1983 reports that 'typically, husbands over-estimated the amounts wives 
spent on leisure, while wives under-estimated how much their husbands spent', p. 132, (see 
also Woolley, 2000 and Treas, 1993). It is reasonable to expect theories to be robust in the 
face of such possibilities. However, our main reason for confidentiality is as follows: Many 
economic theories of the household relate collective choice to individual preferences over 
goods. To test such theories we normally require data about individual preferences over 
commodities. Revealing choices to partners might instead produce information on preferences 
                                                 
8 If one partner predicted perfectly (or scored zero), then provided she or he had perfect recall, 
that subject could deduce a partner's choices. No participant raised this possibility with us 
during the conduct of the experiment and no-one achieved perfection in their predictions (or 
scored zero). 
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over actions. For instance, it might create incentives for individuals to choose so as to garner 
approval from their partners. Such motives may actually be an important source of household 
behaviour, but they are not typically the objects of preference in economic theories of the 
household. So, we opted for confidentiality in our design. 
Following a successful pilot session, the experiments were carried out from December 
2002 to March 2003. Subjects were recruited from the city of Norwich and rural Norfolk via 
email, through community groups and using posters. Session sizes varied from two to ten 
couples and were held at a variety of venues, including a village hall and the experimental 
economics laboratory at the University of East Anglia. In recruiting we required all 
individuals to be over 21, to be living with their partners and to have been together as a couple 
for at least one year. We asked subjects to bring evidence of their relationship and made 
random checks. 9 
 
IV Results. 
We recruited 76 couples for our experiment. Average payoffs were just under £17 per 
individual - more than twice the median hourly post-tax wage for a UK adult in 2003. Ages 
ranged from 22 to 70, with a mean of 37.3. On average couples had been together for 11 years, 
with a maximum of 46 and a minimum of 1. Seventy-three percent of individuals stated that 
they were married to their current partner and all the couples in our sample were heterosexual. 
The distribution of children per couple was bimodal with peaks at zero and two and a mean of 
1.1. So, without being representative of the UK adult population, the subjects were generally 
older and more diverse than the typical sample of university students used in choice 
                                                 
9 Evidence included passports, photos, bills to the same address and, in three cases, children.   
  10 
experiments. 
In what follows, the tasks are labelled. Their details can be found in the Appendix. The 
number identifies the task, while T indicates tasks faced by triangle subjects in their section 1, 
W stands for tasks faced by wave subjects in their section 1 and J indicates tasks put jointly to 
couples in the final part of the experiment.10  
For both joint and separate choice we included four questions (T13, J13, W13 and 
W14) such as the one shown in Figure 1 where one option first-order stochastically dominates 
the other. For these questions the dominated option was chose in just under 6% of 
observations.   
Recall that IP is a feature of what we termed the standard model. We had seven tasks 
where one of the options dominates the other, for subjects whose choices satisfy IP (but not 
necessarily otherwise). In 90% of cases the choice is in conformity with IP and this 
accordance is stronger for the choices made jointly than for those made when the individuals 
are separated.  Suppose we hold the null hypothesis that in all cases subjects mean to choose 
the IP dominating option, but make a mistake in 6% of cases (i.e. the rate of ‘error’ in the 
choices with one dominating option discussed above). With the exception of one task (T11), 
the pattern of choices is consistent with this null hypothesis, suggesting that IP is a reasonable 
assumption in the context of this experiment. We also had a number of tests of IP based on 
pairs of tasks which are equivalent when faced by a chooser who satisfies the IP property. 
That data is more mixed in the conclusions it produces.11 So, the evidence for IP in our data is 
                                                 
10 ‘Groups’ are sets of tasks which are equivalent from the perspective of a chooser who 
satisfies IP.  The task numbers do not match the order of questions, but are purely for 
reference purposes. 
11 For details see Bateman and Munro, 2003, which focuses on the IP issue. 
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not overwhelming and we therefore conduct tests of EUT both with and without its presence 
as an auxiliary assumption.    
Tables 1-3 summarise tests of EUT - tests in Table 1 are based upon the individual 
choice data, Table 2 draws upon the prediction tasks and Table 3 is based upon joint choices. 
All the comparisons shown are within subject or within couple. In the first column of these 
three tables, entries labelled CR represent common ratio tests, those marked CC represent 
common consequence tests, while BB indicates tests of the betweenness property of EUT. The 
next column states whether the comparison is conditional on the assumption of the IP property. 
If it is, then this means that pairs of tasks can only be plotted in the same unit probability 
triangle if IP holds. In the two proportions columns, the numbers represent the fraction of the 
sample choosing the safer option. According to EUT, the fraction should be the same across 
the relevant tasks. This is always the null hypothesis. According to the typical results of 
individual choice experiments the proportion in the task 2 column should be lower.12 This is 
always the alternative hypothesis. Taking all of the tables together we see only one instance of 
equality (the EUT prediction) compared to the remaining 32 cases all of which are in the 
direction of the alternative hypothesis. In the final column we report probability values (to 
three significant figures) for the null hypothesis that the sample proportions are equal, using a 
paired, one-sided z-test. For CR, CC and BB, a large number of these comparisons are 
statistically significant; in many cases at levels of significance well below 0.1%. 
[Table 1 here] 
                                                 
12 Matthew Rabin, 2000, argues that choosing the safe option in choices of this kind is prima 
facie evidence against the EUT model, because it is incompatible with attitudes to risk 
displayed in other settings. In our case, the choice between options also typically reflects 
intrahousehold inequality aversion so the same argument does not automatically apply.   
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Table 1 summarises results for the cases involving separate choice. All the CR and BB 
comparisons are statistically significant at the 10% level or lower. For two CC cases where the 
test is not conditional on IP, the difference in responses to the two tasks is not statistically 
significant.13 So, broadly speaking the evidence for a common ratio effect and for failure of 
the betweenness property is stronger than that for the common consequence effect. In terms of 
the stylised indifference curves in Figure 2, it suggests that the section between a and b is 
roughly parallel to the curve between c and d, but that the indifference curves show increasing 
risk aversion (i.e. become steeper) between b and e. It is worth noting that this pattern persists 
across the variety of tasks listed in the table – for some of these tasks all the payoffs are to the 
choosing agent, but for many tasks both partners might possibly receive payment and in 
several cases it is only the partner that might receive payments. Nevertheless the pattern of 
choices is consistent. 
Table 2 presents the data from the prediction section of the data. These tasks are the 
same as those in Table 1, but it is the other partner who is doing the predicting. All the 
comparisons are statistically significant, even with the CC examples. So, the results suggest 
that prediction deviates significantly from EUT. When we look at the prediction data in detail 
we find that partners predict correctly in 65% of cases. This is significantly better than fifty-
fifty; it is also better than the success rate if they supposed (as a benchmark example) that 
their partner was a risk neutral income pooler. However, if individuals predict according to 
how they themselves choose and preferences are not correlated within couples then the 
predicted success rate is 64.7% - which is not statistically significantly different from the 
                                                 
13 It is also possible to use some Wave responses to create a between-subject CC comparison. 
When this comparison is made a proportion 0.53 choose the safer option out of {a,b} while 
0.43 pick the safer option out of {c,d}.  This is significant at the 10% level (p=0.095). 
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actual value.  
[Table 2 here]. 
The fact that, when separated, individual partners depart from the standard model in 
their choices does not mean that those individuals have non-EUT preferences. They may be 
altruists who believe that their partners have non-EUT preferences.  Similarly, in the absence 
of common knowledge, it cannot be deduced that individuals who predict anomalous 
behaviour in their partners actually believe that their partners have non-EUT preferences.  If, 
though, this was the case, then we would expect the possibilities for communication afforded 
by the joint decision-making responsibility of section 3 to iron out any misunderstandings. In 
fact, as we can see from Table 3, the joint choice data exhibits the same patterns as the 
prediction and separate choice data. This is true with and without the auxiliary assumption of 
IP. Moreover, as with the separated choice, the evidence for common ratio effects and for the 
failure of the betweenness property is stronger than that for the common consequence effect. 
This suggests that the departure from EUT observed in the separate choice and predictions 
data is not simply due to misconceptions about the preferences of partners. Rather, it seems to 
be a persistent feature of choice in the context of multi-person households. 
[Table 3 here]. 
Table 4 summarises some interesting comparisons of choices made jointly (in Section 
3) and when separated (in Section 1) for the four tasks where one option is safer than the other 
and where all the risk is in one partner’s payoffs. Note that, when viewed by Wave and 
Triangle subjects, these tasks appear reflected in the sense that,  for any given task, payoffs 
which belong to the self when Wave chooses belong to the partner when Triangle chooses and 
vice versa. Two things are particularly notable in Table 4. First, the proportions for Wave and 
Triangle subjects are very close – in other words subjects appear to place equal weight on 
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their partner’s payoffs as on their own and are not more or less risk averse when it is their 
partner who faces the risk rather than themselves. Second, perhaps surprisingly, choices made 
jointly are consistently more risk averse than those made separately, to the extent that in three 
of the four cases the difference is statistically significant whichever partner is taken as the 
benchmark. It is not clear to us why this result occurred. Standard risk sharing arguments 
would predict joint choice would exhibit less risk aversion, since it gives opportunities for 
agreeing to ex-post risk sharing transfers. We can also rule out misperception of the partner’s 
degree of risk aversion as the explanation, since there is no evidence for such a bias in the 
prediction data. Possibly, the result is due to the psychology of group choice, one robust 
feature of which (see Kerr et al, 1996, for instance) is that collective decisions are typically 
more extreme than their individual counterparts. Yet, in our case it is not clear why the safe 
option should be viewed as more extreme. A final possibility is suggested by anecdotal 
evidence from our participants, some of whom suggested a ‘fear of recrimination’ as a 
significant factor influencing joint choices. This could make some participants reluctant to be 
seen to be pressing for the risky option.  
[Table 4 here] 
V Discussion. 
The fact that the preferences of two individuals separately obey the assumptions of 
EUT does not imply that their collective decisions will always conform to the same axioms. 
Conversely, depending on the household decision process, it is possible that two individuals 
with non-EUT preferences can produce collective choices that do satisfy the predictions of 
EUT. It follows that tests of whether the decisions of established couples conform to EUT are 
logically separate from the issue of whether individual decisions satisfy the theory. 
Nevertheless, in this experiment couples show the same anomalous patterns in their risky 
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choices as have been frequently observed in individual choice experiments. When separated 
from their partners, individuals who are part of a couple also show the same patterns and 
predict the same patterns in their partner’s choices. The results of the experiment also suggest 
that the results are robust in the face of changes in the identity of who in the household 
receives the payoffs.  
In the face of individual choice anomalies, a number of alternative theories of risky 
choice have been put forward (e.g. regret theory, prospect theory, etc.). To a significant degree, 
these theories have been motivated by ideas drawn from the psychology of the individual. It is 
not clear that the same ideas automatically apply in the household, where decisions are 
typically made in an interactive fashion; other forces may be at the root of the results found 
here. For instance, we found a surprisingly high incidence of examples where, separately both 
individuals chose the risky option in an identical task, but as couples chose the safe option. If 
such patterns are a feature of many households it would suggest that behavioural models of 
collective decision-making may be quite different to their individual decision-making 
counterparts. 
  16 
References. 
Alderman Harold, Chiappori P.A., Haddad L, Hoddinott J, Kanbur R, 1995, Unitary 
Versus Collective Models Of The Household - Is It Time To Shift The Burden Of Proof,  
World Bank Research Observer 10 (1): 1-19 Feb. 
Bateman, Ian and Alistair Munro, 2003, Testing economic models of the household: 
an experiment, CSERGE working paper, University of East Anglia. 
Becker, Gary S., 1974, A theory of social interactions, Journal of Political Economy, 
vol. 82 (6), 1063-1093. 
Bergstrom, Theodore, 1989, A fresh look at the rotten kid theorem and other 
household mysteries, Journal of Political Economy, 97(5), 1138-1159.  
Bone, John, John Hey and John Suckling, 1999, Are Groups More or Less Consistent 
Than Individuals?, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 8, 63-81. 
Bone, John, John Hey and  John Suckling, 2000, A Simple Risk-Sharing Experiment, 
University of York Discussion papers in Economics, No. 2000/36. 
Browning, Martin, and Pierre-Andre Chiappori, 1998. Efficient intra-household 
allocations: a general characterisation and empirical tests. Econometrica 66 (6), 1241–1278. 
Corfman, Kim. P. and  Donald. R. Lehmann, 1987, Models of cooperative group 
decision-making and relative influence: An experimental investigation of family purchase 
decisions. Journal of Consumer Research, 14: 1-13. 
Cubitt, Robin P., Chris.V. Starmer and Robert Sugden, 1998, On the validity of the 
random lottery incentive system, Experimental Economics, 1, 115-131. 
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky, 1979, Prospect Theory: an analysis of decision 
under risk, Econometrica, 47: 263-291. 
  17 
Kerr, Norbert L., MacCoun, Robert J., Kramer, Geoffrey P., 1996 Bias in judgment: 
Comparing individuals and groups. Psychological Review. Oct Vol 103(4) 687-719.  
Lundberg, Shelly J., Robert A. Pollak and Terence J. Wales, 1997, Do Husbands and 
Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit, Journal of 
Human Resources, Vol. 32, No. 3. (Summer,), pp. 463-480. 
Pahl, Jan, 1990, Household spending, personal spending and the control of money in 
marriage, Sociology, 24:1, 119-138. 
Peters, H. Elizabeth, A. Sinan Ünür, Jeremy Clark, William D. Schulze, forthcoming, 
Free-Riding and the Provision of Public Goods in the Family: An Experimental Test of the 
Rotten Kid Theorem, International Economic Review.  
Phipps, Shelley A., and Burton Peter S., 1998, What's Mine is yours? The influence of 
male and female incomes on patterns of household expenditure, Economica, 65, 599-613. 
Rabin, Matthew, 2000, Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration 
Theorem, Econometrica 68: 1281-1292. 
Treas, Judith, 1993, Money in the Bank: Transaction Costs and the Economic 
Organization of Marriage, American Sociological Review 58: 723-734. 
Woolley, Frances, 2000, Control over Money in Marriage, Carleton Economic Papers 
00-07.  
  18 
 
Table 1. Tests of EUT using Separate Choice Data 
N Type of 
comparison 
IP 
assumed? 
Task 1 Task 2 Proportion choosing 
safer option, 
Probability 
     Task 1 Task 2  
76 CR No T6 T8 0.66 0.43 0.000*** 
76 CR Yes T6 T7 0.66 0.54 0.073* 
76 CR Yes T4 T8 0.78 0.43 0.000*** 
76 CR Yes T4 T7 0.78 0.54 0.001*** 
34 CR Yes W4 W7 0.77 0.53 0.001*** 
34 CR Yes W5 W7 0.71 0.53 0.054* 
76 CC No T1 T8 0.50 0.43 0.190 
34 CC No W3 W7 0.53 0.53 0.500 
34 CC Yes T2 T8 0.53 0.32 0.055* 
34 CC Yes W2 W7 0.71 0.47 0.028** 
76 BB No T6 T1 0.66 0.50 0.048** 
34 BB Yes W5 W3 0.71 0.56 0.042** 
76 BB Yes T4 T1 0.78 0.50 0.000*** 
*** indicates difference significant at 1% level, 1 tailed test; ** indicates significant at 5% 
level; * indicates significant at 10% level. 
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Table 2. EUT and Prediction Data 
N Type of 
comparison 
IP 
assumed? 
Task 1 Task 2 Proportion predicting 
safer option 
Probability 
     Task 1 Task 2  
76 CR No T6 T8 0.70 0.43 0.000*** 
76 CR Yes T6 T7 0.70 0.59 0.051* 
76 CR Yes T4 T8 0.88 0.43 0.000*** 
76 CC No T1 T8 0.62 0.43 0.011** 
34 CC No W3 W7 0.47 0.32 0.078* 
34 CC Yes T2 T8 0.68 0.41 0.024** 
34 CC Yes W2 W7 0.68 0.32 0.002*** 
76 BB No T6 T1 0.70 0.62 0.068* 
34 BB Yes W5 W3 0.71 0.47 0.009*** 
76 BB Yes T4 T1 0.88 0.62 0.000*** 
*** indicates difference significant at 1% level, 1 tailed test; ** indicates significant at 5% 
level; * indicates significant at 10% level. 
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Table 3. Tests of EUT using Joint Choice Data 
N Type of 
comparison 
IP 
assumed? 
Task 1 Task 2 Proportion choosing 
safer option, 
Probability 
     Task 1 Task 2  
34 CR Yes J4 J7 0.94 0.59 0.000*** 
34 CR Yes J5 J7 0.88 0.59 0.000*** 
34 CR No J10 J7 0.73 0.59 0.013** 
34 CC No J1 J7 0.71 0.59 0.110 
34 CC Yes J2 J7 0.71 0.59 0.130 
34 CC Yes J9 J11 0.44 0.06 0.000*** 
76 BB No J4 J1 0.94 0.64 0.000*** 
34 BB Yes J5 J1 0.88 0.71 0.006*** 
34 BB Yes J4 J2 0.94 0.71 0.002*** 
34 BB Yes J5 J2 0.88 0.71 0.016** 
*** indicates difference significant at 1% level, 1 tailed test; ** indicates significant at 5% 
level; * indicates significant at 10% level. 
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Table 4. Comparison between choices made jointly and when separated 
 Proportion choosing safer option  
 Separate choice Joint Choice Probability 
Task Triangle Wave Joint  
1 0.5 0.53 0.64 0.030** 
4 0.78 0.77 0.94 0.000*** 
7 0.54 0.53 0.64 0.059* 
9 0.35 0.395 0.44 0.364 
Probability is the p-value associated with the test of equality between the joint choice value 
and the closest value from separate choice. *** indicates difference significant at 1% level, 1 
tailed test; ** indicates significant at 5% level; * indicates significant at 10% level. 
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Question 2 Option A    Option B  
           
For numbers: 1-50 51-100   For numbers: 1-50 51-100  
           
You receive £20 £0   You receive £20 £40  
           Your partner receives £0 £20   Your partner receives £0 £20  
           
           
I choose (tick one): Option A      Option B    
           
 
 
Figure 1. A typical question from section 1 of the experiment. 
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Figure 2. Tests of EUT in the unit probability triangle. 
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Figure 3. Experimental Procedure. 
Subjects enter, allocated ‘wave’ or ‘triangle’ role. 
Section 1: Triangles face 
individual choice questions 1...n 
Sub-groups placed in different rooms. 
Section 1: Waves face 
individual choice questions 
n+1...2n 
Section 2. Prediction of 
partner’s choices in questions 
1...n 
Section 2. Prediction of 
partner’s choices in questions 
n+1...2n 
Groups merge. Couples face joint choice for questions 2n+1...3n. 
One question from 1…3n chosen at random, choice executed. 
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Appendix A. The tasks. 
  Lottery 1 Lottery 2 
  Triangle Wave Triangle Wave 
 Task type £20 £40 £20 £40 £20 £40 £20 £40 
Group 1 1 (T, W, J) 1-100 - - - 21-70 71-100 - - 
 2 (T, W, J) 21-100 - 1-20 - 21-100 - 71-100 - 
 3 (W) - - 1-100 - - - 21-70 71-100 
Group 2 4 (T, W, J) 1-100 - - - - - - 41-100 
 5 (W, J) 1-50 - 51-100 - 41-100 - 41-100 - 
 6 (T) 1-100 - - - - 41-100 - - 
Group 3 7 (T, W, J) - - 51-100 - - - - 71-100 
 8 (T) 51-100 - - - - 71-100 - - 
Group 4 9 (T, W, J) 1-100 - 1-100 - 1-100 - 21-70 71-100 
Group 5 10 (T, W, J) - - 1-100 - - 1-70 - - 
Group 6 11 (T, J) 51-100 - 1-50  1-100 - - 71-100 
 12 (W) 31-100 - 1-30 - - 71-100 1-100 - 
Other 13 (T, W, J) 1-50 - 51-100 - 1-50 51-100 51-100 - 
 14 (W) 1-70 - 21-70 71-100 71-100 - 1-70 - 
 15 (J) - 71-100 1-70 - 1-60 61-100 - - 
 16 (J) - - 21-70 71-100 1-40 - - 71-100 
Note: in this table the numbers shows the ranges of disc values for which the corresponding 
payoffs were awarded. To save space, we omit the numbers for states of the world where the 
payoff was zero.  We also omit those tasks which are not relevant for this paper. 
 
